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paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between 
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a lasting positive impact in scholar’s productivity, leading to higher scholar’s 
productivity rate of growth and higher productivity level.  
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1.  Introduction 
The arguments in favor of academic tenure have focused mainly on academic 
freedom, cost effectiveness and pedagogical quality [McGee and Block, 2001]
1. The 
academic freedom argument states that professors need tenure to avoid losing their jobs 
for defending controversial subjects or espousing unpopular views. Tenure is claimed to 
be cost-effective because people are assumed to be risk-averse and the perspective of 
getting a job for life make them willing to work for less than people who cannot receive a 
guarantee of lifetime employment
2. In addition, tenure solves the moral hazard problem 
of selecting new faculty members. If universities do not have full information to identify 
the best candidates to hire, while incumbent professors do, the incumbents need tenure in 
order to make them reveal who the good candidates are without fear of losing their job to 
accommodate the candidate [Carmichael, 1988]
3. Last but not least, the argument 
regarding pedagogical quality reflects the idea that only those professors who achieve 
excellence in teaching, research and service are awarded tenure. 
These arguments have been heavily criticized. If tenure is really necessary to protect 
freedom of expression, what about the untenured professors that go up for tenure and 
espouse views contrary to the tenured academics that decide their promotion? They may 
have their tenure denied because they disagree with the committee’s view and as a 
                                                 
1 For a review of the tenure literature and recent controversies see McPherson and Shapiro (1999). 
2 As a promotion system academic tenure can be associated to tournaments [e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981] 
since scholars during the probationary period accept below-market wages for above-market effort because 
of the prospect of being rewarded in the future by higher pay and greater job security. 
3 McPherson and Winston (1983) note that academic employment has little internal job mobility. 
Candidates who are hired as faculty members either stay on the faculty or are dismissed. Because of the 
lack of flexibility the university has to adopt more intensive and costly initial screening. 
  2consequence the freedom of expression argument loses value
4. For instance, it has been 
shown that champions of diversity are more interested in imposing "politically correct" 
thoughts and speech on organizations than heralding divergent opinions and experiences 
[Goode, 1991a, b; Scott, 1991; Timmons, 1990; Will, 1991]. 
Concerning the cost effectiveness of tenure, Alchian (1977) argues that tenure is 
neither necessary nor efficient. Moreover, its survival depends upon the absence of a 
competitive environment in the education industry. Colleges and Universities can afford 
incompetent and/or unnecessary tenured professors because the full costs of the tenure 
system are not imposed on them. They are shielded from competition through 
government regulations and accreditation agencies, and they are sometimes heavily 
subsidized by alumni, corporations and governments.  
The pedagogical quality argument is criticized because favoritism and politicking 
plays an important role in the tenure process [Roche, 1969]. In addition, even in the 
absence of bias in the tenure process, there are no guarantees that the excellent untenured 
professor will continue to be excellent after receiving tenure. 
This paper addresses this last issue and disputes its validity by arguing that academic 
excellence can be a permanent trait of anyone who achieves it. That is, an excellent 
untenured scholar continues to be excellent after receiving tenure if the tenure process 
creates incentives that make this scholar develop academic habits. Therefore, the creation 
of academic habits represents another argument in favor of academic tenure. 
Academic habits are the working habits a person develops in order to achieve the 
required standards of academic excellence, which ultimately lead to tenure. These 
                                                 
4 For McKenzie (1996) tenure is a means of protecting individual faculty members from political infighting 
by increasing the costs predatory faculty members must incur to be successful in having more productive 
colleagues dismissed. For a model of academic sabotage see Faria (1998). 
  3working habits depend on several factors including hard work, dedication, perseverance, 
collegiality, intellectual honesty, creativity and personality, to cite a few.  
In this paper we do not question the existence of the tenure system; we take it as 
given and put forward a model where tenure rules and standards affect academic habit 
formation. In the model the academic department sets the tenure rules and standards for 
tenure-track faculty members that lead to the build up of academic habits. Academic 
habits have a lasting impact on a scholar’s career, shaping its future achievements 
regarding research, teaching and service. As a result, once a scholar has a stock of 
academic habits, he will remain productive even after receiving tenure. 
When a scholar achieves excellence in teaching and service, it is hard to see them 
declining. A good teacher generally employs the same successful pedagogical techniques 
and is often required to teach the same courses year after year, which makes his job easier 
with seniority. The same holds true for service, once the scholar becomes a good 
administrator there is no reason to believe that these skills will disappear in the future. 
However, if a scholar has achieved excellence in research, by no means does it guarantee 
that he will continue to be successful in the future. This happens because to keep 
excellence in research the academic must employ time and skills in acquiring new 
knowledge, techniques and be lucky enough to have his ideas welcomed by his peers in 
an increasingly competitive environment which is the market for publications in peer 
review journals.  
Therefore, the underlying important question of our study is the following: Why 
would a tenured professor bother to do research at all? Given the fact that he will not lose 
his job if he does not publish, why spend time in keeping up with the frontier of 
  4knowledge?
5 Our answer to this question is simple: because the scholar has a stock of 
academic habits that have a lasting impact in his future productivity. 
Although Levin and Stephan (1991) find that the research productivity of scientists 
reduces with age, this can be understood as a consequence of a life cycle of academic 
productivity. Regarding economists, Hamermesh (1998) finds that publications in leading 
journals decline very sharply with age. However, what matters here is whether tenure 
affects future research productivity of scholars that acquire academic habits and are 
considered high achievers. According to Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) and Bess 
(1998) among those faculty who begin as high publishers “there is virtually no change in 
productivity rates after tenure” [Bess, 1998, p.12]. 
This paper presents a Stackelberg differential game between departments and 
scholars, where the department is the leader and the representative scholar is the follower.   
It is assumed that the department solved its moral hazard problem through incumbents’ 
choice of the best candidate for the job, which is the representative tenure-track scholar. 
In the differential game the department takes into account the effects of its choice of 
tenure rules and standards on the scholar’s productivity and academic habit formation, 
while the scholar takes the department choice as given. It is shown that departments can 
set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. 
As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive effect in scholar’s productivity, 
leading to a higher scholar’s productivity rate of growth and productivity level.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the scholar problem is presented, 
while the department problem appears in section 3. Section 4 presents the steady state 
                                                 
5 Samuelson’s answer to this question is that scholars seek fame [Samuelson, 1995]. However, after years 
being successful publishing, the marginal gain in reputation is arguably low. For a model of a reputation-
seeking academic see Faria (2002). 
  5equilibrium of the model. The comparative statics analysis is shown in section 5. Section 
6 brings the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The scholar problem 
The scholar’s preferences over time are represented by the utility integral 
∫
∞ −
0 ) , ( dt e H F U
rt
t t ;  ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 < ≤ > H FF F U U U and    (1)  0 ≤ FH U
Where  r>0 is the scholar’s rate of time preference, F is the scholar’s academic 
productivity and H is the scholar’s reference academic productivity level, i.e., the stock 
of academic habits.  
The sign of the first derivative of U(.) with respect to F results from the 
intellectual formation of a tenure-track professor. There is a self-selection process in the 
human capital formation of an individual that chooses to remain for a number of years in 
the university aiming at obtaining a Ph.D. degree [which is a pre-requisite for a university 
career as a professor]. Anecdotal evidence suggests that students that love to study are the 
ones that choose to remain at the university pursuing a Ph.D. degree. This is why we 
assume the representative scholar to derive pleasure from his academic work.  
Concerning the impact of academic habits, we follow the literature on habit 
formation in which the stock of habits are assumed to have a negative marginal utility 
[e.g., Heal and Ryder, 1973]
6. Regarding the second derivative of U in relation to the 
stock of habits, it is generally assumed [e.g., Abel, 1990] that  , while in the  0 < HH U
                                                 
6 Dupor and Liu (2003) distinguish between the notion of “jealousy” and “admiration” by looking at the 
first derivative of the reference benchmark on utility. By assuming a negative first derivative we are 
considering that preferences exhibit jealousy. 
  6particular branch of rational addiction models in some cases [e.g., Gavrila et al., 2005] 
we have  .  0 > HH U
  It is important to emphasize that the habit formation framework is particularly 
useful here because of the learning process implicit in it. For instance, in models of habit 
formation in consumption it is assumed that people learn to consume by consuming and 
the more they learn the more they enjoy [Boyer, 1978]. This idea is extended in a series 
of cases were learning plays an important role. Jellal and Garoupa (2004), for example, 
develop a model of enforcement learning where the law enforcement agency accumulates 
data and information on criminals, which decreases agency’s costs and enhances its 
ability to perform its duties. More closely to our problem, however, is the idea put 
forward by Faria and Leon-Ledesma (2004) in which labor is habit forming
7 in 
accordance with society’s culture.  
In the present context, we assume that the scholar develops his working habits 
taking into account the average academic productivity level of his peers P [which can be 
his former professors, actual department colleagues or any other relevant academic group 
such as the people around the world that do research in his specific field], and his own 
productivity F, in order to achieve the tenure standards, T, set by the department
8: 
) (
1 T P F H − Ω + =
−
•
φ φ ρ    (2) 
the speed of adjustment, ρ, parameterizes the relative importance of recent productivity in 
determining the reference stock. Therefore, higher values of ρ indicate a lower level of 
                                                 
7 See also Dimitrova (2004) and Gurdgiev (2004). 
8Using Mumford and Smith (2004) terminology expression (2) can be defined in terms of the employee 
characteristics [measured by (F)] and the workplace effects [measured by (P)]. However, our definition of 
workplace effects is broader than theirs, because we do not limit our workplace effects to the current place 
where the scholar works.    
  7persistence in habits. The parameter φ lies in the unitary interval. Setting the parameter 
φ=0 identifies the outward-looking scholar, for whom the academic habits formation 
depend only on T and P. While by setting φ=1 corresponds to the inward-looking 
scholar
9, for whom the reference stock depends on his own past levels of productivity as 
well as T. Finally, the constant  0 > Ω warrants the non-negativity of  since it is 
assumed that  . 
•
H
φ φ − − ≥ Ω
1 P F T
It is important to stress that tenure rules and standards, T, are objective measures 
of scholar’s achievement. For example, regarding research, T is a list of peer reviewed 
journals with respective weights and indicates a minimum amount of points the tenure-
track faculty should obtain in order to be considered for tenure promotion.  
  The representative scholar problem is to use his productivity, F, as a control 
variable to maximize (1) subject to (2), which yields the following Hamiltonian function: 
) ( ) , (
1 T P F H F U J − Ω + + =
−φ φ λρ          (3) 
Where λ denotes the scholar’s shadow value of academic habits.  





aF H F U − = ) , (.  
It is convenient to mention that the linearity of the utility function in relation to F is not a 
problem for our model since the optimality conditions from the Maximum principle 
require that the Hamiltonian function be maximized with respect to the control variable F 
at every point of time. It is easy to see that the Hamiltonian function J is concave in 
                                                 
9 See Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) where an outward-looking agent specification captures the 
characteristics of a catching up with the Joneses model, while the inward-looking agent specification 
characterizes the habit formation model. 
  8relation to F. Regarding the second derivative of the utility function, U, in relation to H, 
we must consider two cases: i) if 0< ξ<1, then ; ii) if ξ>1, then .  0 > HH U 0 < HH U
The first order conditions for the scholar’s problem are: 
0 0
1 1 = + ⇒ =
− − φ φ λφρ P F a J F                 (4) 
1 −
• •
= − ⇒ − = −
ξ λ λ λ λ bH r J r H                (5) 
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The examination of equation (6) leads us to the first important result of the paper, 
which is summarized in proposition 1: 
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3.  The department problem 
                                                 
10 Notice how, in the case of admiration ( 0 ξ < ), this result is magnified. In this case the agent’s utility 
increases with a ceteris paribus increase in the habit stock, i.e. the agent feels better off if members of the 
community around him are successful. The magnification effect reflects the fact that the agent will try to 
imitate the people he admires, therefore increases in H will make the scholar’s productivity rate of growth  
increase by more than in the case that preferences reflect jealousy.   
  9The department problem is to set the tenure rules and standards, T, in order to 
maximize the department’s preferences over time, 
∫
∞ −




while taking into consideration the scholar’s reaction function, described by equation (6), 
together with the scholar’s constraint, given by equation (2).  
Notice that π>0 is the department’s rate of time preference. In what follows we 
examine two cases of interest: 1) when the scholar is more impatient than the department, 
π > r ; 2) when the department is more impatient than the scholar,  π < r . 
 Assuming , we have the following Hamiltonian function for the 
department problem: 
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The first order conditions for the department problem are: 
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4.  The steady state equilibrium 
  10Imposing the stationary conditions,   in (2), (6), (9) and (10) and 
considering equation (8), we can determine the steady state values of  H, F, T, µ and δ: 
0 = = = =
• • • •
δ µ F H
Ω + = ⇒ =
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0
1
0 = − ⇒ = µρ
T
KT                  (15) 
The system of equations (11)-(15) determines simultaneously the steady state 
values of H, F, T, µ and δ. Ιn order to disentangle this system to find explicit values for 
the endogenous variables, substitute eq. (14) into (13), which eliminates both co-state 
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Solving the system of equations (11), (12) and (16) for H, F, T, yields the 
following steady state values denoted by an asterisk and expressed as a function of F* 
[see Appendix]: 
) 1 /( 1 2 1
1
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=                                              (19) 
The non-negativity conditions for F*, T* and H* are: 1) 0< ξ<1, and  π < r ; 2) 
ξ>1, and  π > r . 
The following propositions have trivial proofs. The second important result of this 
paper appears in the proposition 2 below: 
Proposition 2: The steady state values of scholar’s productivity and academic habits are 
positively related, dF*/dH* > 0. 
  Propositions 1 and 2, for the particular case 1) 0< ξ<1, and  π < r , highlight the 
main contribution of this paper regarding the relationship between academic habits and 
scholar’s productivity. They show that academic habits have lasting positive effects on 
scholar’s productivity, since it leads to a higher scholar’s productivity rate of growth and 
scholar’s productivity level. 
  Proposition 3 below describes the importance of tenure rules and standards: 
Proposition 3: The optimal tenure rules and standards T* have a positive impact in the 
scholar’s productivity and academic habit formation: dF*/dT*>0 and dH*/dT* >0. 
Proposition 3 shows that the department can create incentives, through objective 
tenure rules and standards that build academic habits with lasting effects on the scholar’s 
academic productivity. 
 
5.  The comparative statics analysis 
  12Besides the relationship among the endogenous variables as exposed in 
Propositions 2 and 3, the comparative statics analysis illuminates other properties of the 
model. The marginal impact of each parameter appears in the table below: 
  a b r φ  ρ  π  P 
F* (-)  (+) (-)  (+,-)  (+) (+) (+) 
T* (-)  (+) (-)  (+,-)  (+) (+) (+) 
H* (-)  (+) (+) (+,-)  (+) (-)  (+) 
  
Notice that the higher the scholar’s impatience (r) and preference for academic 
productivity (a), the lower the equilibrium level of scholar’s productivity, F*, and tenure 
rules and standards, T*. In contrast, the higher the department’s rate of time preference 
(π) and scholar’s preference for academic habits (b), and lower the level of persistence in 
habits [higher ρ], the higher the scholar’s productivity and tenure rules and standards. 
Concerning the optimal stock of academic habits, H*, it increases with the scholar’s 
impatience (r) and decreases with department’s impatience (π) . 
The last column shows the impact of the exogenous variable P on the endogenous 
variables of the model. An increase in the exogenous productivity level of academic peers 
leads to an increase in the scholar’s productivity and academic habits as well as to an 
increase in the tenure rules and standards. That is, when the average level of productivity 
of the academic community increases, this raises the standards for prospective scholars. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
  13Why some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? If they are not 
supposed to lose their jobs if they become less productive, why do they bother in keeping 
up with other scholars and with the pace of evolution of knowledge? This paper answers 
this question by arguing that scholars who develop a stock of academic habits and 
achieve excellence are able to maintain their academic productivity at high levels even 
after receiving tenure. In a nutshell, the formation of academic habits has a lasting impact 
in a scholar’s future productivity. 
This paper shows that departments can use tenure rules and standards as an incentive 
system to make scholars develop working habits that ultimately leads to a successful and 
productive career as academics.  In a Stackelberg differential game between departments 
and scholars, the department takes into account the effects of its choice of tenure rules 
and standards on the scholar’s productivity and academic habit formation, while the 
scholar takes the department choice as given.  In the optimal solution of the model it is 
shown that academic habits have a lasting positive impact in the scholar’s productivity, 
leading to a higher scholar’s productivity rate of growth and productivity level. 
Moreover, tenure rules and standards increase with the average level of productivity of 
the academic community. 
  14 
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APPENDIX 
In this appendix we show how to derive the steady state equilibrium, given by 
equations (17)-(19) in the paper. We begin by manipulating (12) in order to 
obtain() ( PF H a r b )
1 1 φ ξ φρ =
− −  and replacing this in (16), we get 
2 2 2
12 1 ()
(1 ) ( 1)
ba r b a r
HF H r H H
ab a b
ξξ ξ φρ φ ρ
ξπ π φ
φρ φρ
−− − 1 ξ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
−= − − − ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
(A.3) 
which after some algebra can be expressed as, 










−− =       ( A . 4 )  






φρ − −Ω =       ( A . 5 )  
and replacing this in (A.4) yields, 
() ( ) () ( )( ) 1 Hr rT πφπφ ρ ξ −− = −− Ω 1
1 φφ − Ω
    (A.6) 
To find the steady state we solve (11), (12) and (A.6) for H, T and F. 
Solving (12) for H, and replacing this in (A.6) along with the 
conditionTF , yields,  P =+
  18()
() ( ) ()
1
1 1 1 1
1
FP r Fa r
Pb r
φ φφ ξ φρξ
φρ π φπ
− − − ⎡⎤ − ⎛⎞ = ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
   (A.7) 
solving this for F we obtain equation (16), while equations (17)and (18) result from (11) 
and (A.6) respectively. 
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